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COOPER V. AARON: THE FIRST IN THE TRIFECTA OF MODERN
AMERICAN FEDERALISM CASES
Ronald L. Nelson
Cooper v. Aaron is, indeed, still timely after sixty years. Not only has
this 1958 decision of the Supreme Court of the United States had a
continuing legacy in the development of civil rights in America, it has also
played a significant role in the development of the modern relationship
between the American federal government and the American states. The
federal-state relationship, a product of this country’s unique brand of
federalism, has been in flux since the days before the adoption of the
Constitution and the 10th Amendment. Cooper v. Aaron, along with the
subsequent decisions in New York v. United States (1992) and Printz v.
United States (1996), have established boundaries between federal
supremacy and state sovereignty that have had significant relevance in 21st
century America. While Cooper declared supremacy for federal judicial
interpretations, New York and Printz placed limits on federal legislative
supremacy. The framework, produced by this trifecta of decisions, is the
basis of the contemporary view of American federalism. This federalism is
evident in the politically charged decision in National Federation of
Independent Businesses v. Sebelius (2012) as well as the recently decided
case of Murphy v. NCAA (2018). Both Sebelius and Murphy are examples of
the trifecta’s federalism, a federalism that exhibits the judicial supremacy of
Cooper as well as the commandeering limits of New York and Printz. While
sixty years may seem to be a long time in the federalism years, Cooper is,
indeed, still with us.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The 1958 Cooper v. Aaron1 decision has taken its place in a long line
of court cases decided over the years that have attempted to address racial
discrimination in this country. While not all of the civil rights cases involved
segregated schools, many of the earlier landmark cases were in the area of
education e.g., Gaines v. Canada2 invalidating Missouri’s refusal to allow
African Americans to attend the University of Missouri School of Law,
Sweatt v. Painter3 invalidating a Texas plan to force African American
students to attend an inferior law school, and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents4 invalidating segregated classrooms in graduate classes at the
University of Oklahoma. Following the 1954 and 1955 Brown I5 and Brown
II6 decisions, the Civil Rights struggle of African Americans largely took
place in the K-12 school houses of the country.7
The basic facts of Cooper illustrate the strife of that period of our
history. In the fall of 1957, certain state officials in Arkansas took actions to
forcibly prohibit African American children from entering and
desegregating Central High School in the city of Little Rock.8 This action
was taken in direct contravention of a federal district court order and a local
desegregation plan.9 The beginning of the 1957 school year saw Arkansas
National Guard troops deployed to prevent African American students from
entering Central High School as well as the subsequent deployment of
federal troops and federalized state troops to allow students, who have come
to be known as the Little Rock Nine,10 to attend the school. Eventually,
Arkansas officials closed the high school as a means to foreclose integration
in 1958.11 This action was challenged in federal court.12 The eventual result
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

358 U.S. 1 (1958).
305 U.S. 337 (1938).
339 U.S. 629 (1950).
McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), supplemented, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
See J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND
SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954-1978 (1979).
8. Desegregation of Central High School, ENCYCLOPEDIA ARK. HIST. & CULTURE,
http://www.encyclopediaofarkansas.net/encyclopedia/entry-detail.aspx?entryID=718
(last
updated Nov. 13, 2018).
9. Id.
10. Little Rock Nine, ENCYCLOPEDIA ARK. HIST. & CULTURE, http://www.encyclopediaof
arkansas.net/encyclopedia/entry-detail.aspx?entryID=723 (last updated Sept. 9, 2010)
[hereinafter Little Rock Nine].
11. Id.
12. Aaron v. Cooper, ENCYCLOPEDIA ARK. HIST. & CULTURE, http://www.encyclopedia
ofarkansas.net/encyclopedia/entry-detail.aspx?search=1&entryID=741 (last updated Nov. 13,
2018) [hereinafter Aaron v. Cooper].
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was the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Cooper v. Aaron and the
re-opening of the Little Rock school.13 This was an important step along the
long path toward desegregation in the United States and the overall
application of the Brown decisions.
Not surprisingly, the Cooper decision was controversial. The obvious
direct area of contention involved battles between integration and
segregation proponents. The desegregation of American public schools went
through a number of phases involving political resistance and such issues as
busing and privatization.14 An additional area of controversy involved
questions concerning the role of the courts in addressing federal and state
governmental relationships. Even after sixty years, the Cooper decision
addresses serious questions regarding the very structure of the American
system of government.
The unique American system of constitutional government is based on
a structure established by the attendees of the constitutional convention held
in the summer months of 1787. While not explicitly stated in the document,
this system has three significant underlying and, in many ways, intertwined
principles:
1. the separation of powers/checks and balances doctrine—which
governs relations among the branches of the federal government,
2. federalism—which governs relations between the states and the
federal government, and
3. individual rights and liberties—which governs relations between the
government and the people.15

These principles are interrelated and have been defined and refined by
amendments, war, and decisions of the courts—particularly the Supreme
Court.16 The federalism principle, in particular, has been shaped by the
Supreme Court’s Cooper decision.
13. See id.; Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
14. See WILKINSON, supra note 7, at 78–127.
15. See LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANGING
AMERICA: A SHORT COURSE 7–10 (7th ed. 2018).
16. The development of modern American federalism has been greatly affected by such
factors as the 14th Amendment and the Civil War as well as the decisions of the Supreme
Courts. See e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (holding that
Maryland could not tax the Federal Government); Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911)
(holding that the Federal Government could not dictate which city Oklahoma chose for its
capital). For a broad view of the development of American federalism see DAVID M.
O’BRIAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLICY 681–688 (7th ed. 2008); Edwin S. Corwin, The
Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950); Harry N. Schreiber, Federalism and
Legal Process: Historical and Contemporary Analysis of the American System, 14 L. &
SOC’Y REV. 663 (1980).
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II. AMERICAN FEDERALISM
A.

History

Our nation’s Constitution was crafted some 231 years ago in
Philadelphia when fifty-five delegates from the states met to address
deficiencies in the Articles of Confederation. What resulted was the creation
of a new kind of federated government.17 This new form—American
federalism—was and still is a multifaceted political power relationship
between governments and governmental units. Given the already existing
states and the need to create an overarching central government, this
federalism was the result of a complex18 set of compromises.19 These
compromises produced a document that is only the basic outline of a twogovernment system.20 One effect of this duality is that the American system
consists of multiple layers of governments. Much of this American system
was in a “to be determined” mode.21 In this form of federalism, there are
both state and federal laws as well as a dual court system state and federal.22
This federal form of government coupled with the three-branch principle
created what Madison’s Federalist No. 51 characterized as a “double
security” for the rights of the people.23
B.

Different Federalisms and Different Eras

The development of American federalism has been an ongoing process
characterized by swings between two basic views of the power relationship
between the federal government and the state governments. One view holds
that the federal government and the states are basically equal sovereigns
each with their own separate powers.24 This view has been called Dual

17. See generally FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 276 (1985).
18. John Quincy Adams described the American system with its separate federal
branches and its sovereignty shared by federal and state governments as “the most
complicated government on the face of the globe.” See John Quincy Adams, 6th President of
the United States, Requested Address at the New York Historical Society: The Jubilee of the
Constitution - A Discourse (Apr. 30, 1939), available at https://lonang.com/library/reference/
jqadams-jubilee-constitution-1839/.
19. JOHN C. LIVINGSTON & ROBERT G. THOMPSON, THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED
151–53 (2d ed. 1963).
20. Id. at 150.
21. See generally KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 71
(1st ed. 1989).
22. See O’BRIAN, supra note 16, at 796–98.
23. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
24. EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 15, at 192, 193 tbl.6-1.
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Federalism25 or Dual Sovereignty.26 Dual Federalism relies on a strict view
of the 10th Amendment’s reserve powers provisions.27 Under this view,
Dual Federalism is characterized by such principles as:
 state and federal governments are coequal sovereigns each supreme
in their own sphere;
 the Constitution is a compact between the states and the federal
government;
 the 10th Amendment defines the state-federal relationship; and
 the necessary and proper clause is to be read narrowly. 28

The other view of the federal-state power relationship, known as
Cooperative Federalism29 or Cooperative Sovereignty,30 sees the federal
government as generally controlling or supreme.31 This view is largely based
on the supremacy clause of Article VI of the Constitution.32 Cooperative
federalism is characterized by the view that:
 the federal government is supreme in all areas under its jurisdiction
even if the state sphere is affected;
 the Constitution is a product of the people’s consent and not the
states;
 the 10th Amendment is not a source of power for the states; and

25. Id.; See also Troy E. Smith, Dual Federalism, in FEDERALISM IN AMERICA: AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://encyclopedia.federalism.org/index.php/Dual_Federalism (last visited
Dec. 31, 2018) [hereinafter Dual Federalism].
26. The term “dual sovereignty” has in some cases been used to describe the dual
federalism concept. See e.g., infra note 98 and accompanying text (Justice Antonin Scalia’s
use of the term to describe the American constitutional system in Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 918 (1997)).
27. See Dual Federalism, supra note 25; EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 15, at 192, 193
tbl.6-1.
28. EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 15, at 192, 193 tbl.6-1.
29. Id. at 192; see also Mary Hallock Morris, Cooperative Federalism, in FEDERALISM
IN AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://encyclopedia.federalism.org/index.php/Cooperative
_Federalism (last visited Dec. 31, 2018) [hereinafter Cooperative Federalism].
30. The term “cooperative sovereignty” has in some cases been used to describe the
cooperative federalism concept. See, e.g., SHAILER MATHEWS, THE VALIDITY OF AMERICAN
IDEAS 150–63 (1922).
31. See Cooperative Federalism, supra note 29; EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 15, at
192, 193 tbl.6-1.
32. See Cooperative Federalism, supra note 29; EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 15, at
192, 193 tbl.6-1.
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 the necessary and proper clause is to be read broadly. 33

These two alternate views of American federalism frequently collide
when state and federal boundary questions arise. These questions first ask
who has the authority to decide, and then ask where exactly the boundary
between federal and state sovereigns is. Such issues have found their way to
the Supreme Court on a regular and continuing basis, and the Court has
struggled with them. In fact, some scholars who have tracked the Court’s
view over the years suggest that there has been a pendulum swing between
the two. For example, political scientists Lee Epstein of Washington
University and Thomas Walker of Emory University observed the following
eras or doctrinal cycles:

C.

Marshall Court (1801–1835)

Cooperative Federalism

Taney Court (1835–1864)

Dual Federalism

Civil War/Reconstruction Court (1865–1895)

Cooperative Federalism

Laissez-Faire Court (1896–1936)

Dual Federalism

Post-New Deal Court (1937–1975)

Cooperative Federalism

Burger Court (1976–1985)

Dual to Cooperative
Federalism

Rehnquist Court (1986–2005)

Mild Dual Federalism

Roberts Court (2005–present)

Mild Dual Federalism34

Modern Federalism

As demonstrated by the swings from Dual to Cooperative
Federalism and back, the question of where the boundary is between the
federal government and the states is complicated. The answer to the
question is, in some respects, tied to another aspect of the American system.
The principle of separation of powers plays a role here. For where the
33. EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 15, at 193 tbl.6-1.
34. Id. at 193 tbl.6-2. For a background discussion of American federalism, see
RICHARD H. LEACH, AMERICAN FEDERALISM 1–24 (1st ed. 1970). For opposing views of the
general development of modern American federalism, see John Kinkaid, The Eclipse of Dual
Federalism by One-Way Cooperative Federalism, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1061 (2017),
http://arizonastatelawjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Kincaid_Pub.pdf (discussing
limits of states in federal-state relations); John C. Yoo, Sounds of Sovereignty: Defining
Federalism in the 1990s, 32 IND. L. REV. 27 (1998), https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu
/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1777&context
=facpubs (discussing a rise in modern dual federalism).
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boundary lies often depends on which branch or branches of the federal
government are involved with what aspect of the states. For example, in
Cooper, the primary players were the federal courts and the state of
Arkansas.35 In the 1992 New York v. United States36 case, the primary
players were Congress and the state of New York.
Moreover, in the 1997 Printz v. United States37 case, the primary
players were Congress and the two county sheriffs. Cooper, New York, and
Printz form a trifecta of cases that highlight and inform the ongoing debates
that surround modern American federalism.38 American federalism is a
complex institution. In particular, this quality is apparent in the federal-state
relationships concerning the issues of supremacy and commandeering.
Some might ask why use the term “trifecta” when discussing Supreme
Court cases and federalism. What is a “trifecta?” For some in Little Rock,
the term is quite familiar. Quite familiar since the Oaklawn Park Racetrack
is just some fifty miles or so down the road from the University of Arkansas
at Little Rock’s William H. Bowen School of Law campus. And, while the
horse racing season is over for Oaklawn Park this year, some are looking
forward to the next season and the opportunity to speculate on the first,
second, and third place finishers of the race with a trifecta wager. Aside
from the horse racing betting, the term trifecta has, according to the
Merriam-Webster Dictionary, come to mean a grouping of three things.39
Cooper, New York, and Printz are three Supreme Court cases that have
played a significant first, second, and third place role in shaping the
interplay of constitutional principles in modern American society—
particularly in the development of the contemporary application of
American federalism.40
1.

Cooper v Aaron: States, the Court and Supremacy

Cooper v. Aaron, first in the trifecta of modern federalism cases, dealt
with a state’s defiance of a federal court order to desegregate a public school
in accordance with the Brown decision.41 The Cooper decision, a unanimous
per curium opinion signed by the nine justices, addressed the question of the
location of the boundary between a state and the federal judicial branch as

35. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
36. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
37. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
38. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 1; New York, 505 U.S. at 144; Printz, 521 U.S. at 898.
39. Trifecta, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/trifecta (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
40. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 1; New York, 505 U.S. at 144; Printz, 521 U.S. at 898.
41. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 4; see also Little Rock Nine, supra note 10.
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well as the question of who is to decide federalism issues.42 As stated in the
opinion, the Cooper case involved “actions by the Governor and Legislature
of Arkansas upon the premise that they are not bound by our holding in
Brown v. Board of Education.”43 While the School Board of Little Rock
formulated a desegregation plan for Central High School for the 1957 school
year, the plan was thwarted by state legislation and Arkansas’s Governor
who ordered the intervention by state National Guard troops.44 Eventually,
federal and federalized troops were employed to restore order to Little Rock
and to allow African American students to attend school.45
In defiance of Brown and desegregation, Governor Orval Faubus
declared that “the Supreme Court decision is not the law of the land.”46 The
Cooper case was filed in response to the local School Board’s subsequent
request for a two-and-a-half year delay in implementing segregation in Little
Rock.47 In offering a specific response to Governor Faubus’s argument that
the Brown decision was not the law of the land, the Supreme Court declared
that “we should answer the premise of the actions of the Governor and
Legislature that they are not bound by our holding in the Brown case.”48 The
Court’s rejection of the Faubus position was based on three sources:
(1) Article VI Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution that declares that the
Constitution is the “supreme Law of the Land;” 49
(2) Article VI Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution that requires every state
legislator, executive, and judicial officer to take an oath to support the
Constitution; and50
(3) the Marbury v Madison51 decision that identifies the Constitution as
“the fundamental and paramount law of the nation;” 52 and affirms that “it
is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is.”53 The Cooper decision declares that:

42. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 19.
43. Id. at 4.
44. Little Rock Nine, supra note 10.
45. Id.
46. Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron
Revisited, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 397 (1982) https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs
/328/ (citing NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN
THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950’S, 273 (1st ed. 1969)).
47. Aaron v. Cooper, supra note 12.
48. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 17.
49. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
50. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
51. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
52. Id. at 177.
53. Id.
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the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of
the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been
respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and
indispensable feature of our constitutional system. It follows
that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme
law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of
binding effect on the States.54

In essence, the Court ruled that it was the decider of the boundary
question and that the boundary in the case of desegregation was on the side
of the federal government and the Brown decisions.55 As a result of this
reasoning, the Court ruled that desegregation in Little Rock should move
forward, that the state should desist from further efforts to thwart the
desegregation plan, and that the state was bound to action by federalism and
the Constitution, as interpreted by the Court in Brown.56
a.

Judicial Supremacy and its critics

While many recognize that the situation in Little Rock required firm
action in the face of the action of the Arkansas officials, the Cooper decision
and its claim of what has been called the concept of “judicial supremacy”
has had its critics. Perhaps most notably, a number of Presidents, e.g.,
Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, and Roosevelt have indicated opposition to the
concept of judicial supremacy.57 Academic commentators such as Professors
Alexander Bickel and Phillip Kurland have written extensively criticizing
the Court’s Cooper decision.58 Others have argued that, rather than supreme,
the Court’s pronouncements should be viewed as part of a dialogue with the
other branches.59 Former Attorney General Edwin Meese has expressed the
view that constitutional interpretation is independent for each branch.60

54. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18.
55. Id.; see also Aaron v. Cooper, supra note 12.
56. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18; see also Aaron v. Cooper, supra note 12.
57. See generally Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword: We the
Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 5, 6 (2001); Dale Carpenter, Judicial Supremacy and Its
Discontents, 20 CONST. COMMENT 405 (2003), http://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_
articles/144; Paul Moreno, The Myth of Judicial Supremacy, NAT’L REV. (June 26, 2015, 6:20
PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2015/06/not-law-land/.
58. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 263–65 (2d ed. 1962); PHILIP KURLAND, POLITICS, THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE WARREN COURT 116, 185 (1970).
59. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577
(1993).
60. Edwin Meese III, Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 981 (1987).
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Additionally, Mr. Meese has asserted that there is a distinction between
the Constitution and constitutional law. And, more particularly, he has
claimed that the Constitution “is a document of our most fundamental law”
while constitutional law is what the Supreme Court, “in its limited role of
offering judgment” says about the Constitution.61 Given this distinction, Mr.
Meese views Supreme Court decisions as only binding on “the parties in a
case and also the executive branch for whatever enforcement is necessary.
However, such a decision does not establish a supreme law of the land that
is binding on all persons and parts of the government henceforth and
forevermore.”62 With respect to Cooper, Mr. Meese argues that the Court’s
assumption of supremacy was based on a “flawed reading” of Marbury and
that the equating of the Court’s decisions with the Constitution itself was
based on a faulty syllogism of legal reasoning.63
Professor Ashutosh Bhagwat of Hastings College of Law has argued
that the view that state officials are obliged to support and cooperate with
federal laws is “inconsistent with the constitutional vision of the Framers”
and that the actions of Arkansas’s governor and legislature were moral and
not constitutional errors.64 Citing Madison’s double security in Federalist
51,65 Professor Bhagwat argues that the judicial supremacy of the Cooper
decision contradicts the role of federalism in the Framer’s design.66 In his
view “federalism is as important a part of our system of limited and
balanced powers as is the separation of powers at the national level.”67 And,
in order for the design to work “state governments, no less than the branches
of the national government, must have the ability to resist (to their minds)
improper assertions of power from the center.”68 Professor Bhagwat goes so
far as to conclude that “sometimes the role of state officials includes
disagreement with, and even defiance of, the policies and meanings
championed by federal officials, including the federal judiciary.” 69 With
respect to the judiciary, the Professor does note that such resistance is not
applicable to the state courts in that the state judges are bound to treat
61. Id. at 981–82.
62. Id. at 983.
63. Id. at 986; but see Allan Ides, Judicial Supremacy and the Law of the Constitution,
47 UCLA L. REV. 491, 519 (1999) (“[W]hen the Supreme Court declares what the law of the
Constitution is, the Constitution and the Court’s interpretation of it become one, and the
Court’s interpretation of the Constitution is, therefore one with the supreme law of the
land.”).
64. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Cooper v. Aaron and the Faces of Federalism, 52 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 1087, 1087–88 (2008).
65. Id. at 1097.
66. Id. at 1087.
67. Id. at 1097.
68. Id. at 1097–98.
69. Id. at 1113.
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federal law as supreme over state law.70 On the other hand, as seen by the
cases of Chief Judge Roy Moore of the Alabama Supreme Court involving
the application of Supreme Court decisions on Ten Commandment displays
and same-sex marriage, some argue that federal court decisions do not bind
state courts.71
Professor Larry Kramer, Professor of Law at New York University, in
discussing his view of “the idea of judicial supremacy,”72 notes that “The
Supreme Court has made its grab for power. The question is will we let
them get away with it?”73 In subsequent work, Professor Kramer writes that
the public should be the ultimate supreme decider of the judicial decisions. 74
His view of the proper balance in our system is that “the authority of judicial
decisions formally and explicitly depends on reactions from the other
branches and, through them, from the public.”75 He answers his earlier
question by declaring that “[t]he Supreme Court is not the highest authority
in the land on constitutional law. We are.”76
b.

Cooper and general acceptance

On the other hand, while Professor Kramer calls the Cooper claim of
judicial supremacy “bluster and puff,” he acknowledges that the concept has
found “wide public acceptance.”77 Others have also noted Cooper’s
acceptance. For example, David Strauss of the University of Chicago argues
that the “moral capital” accumulated from cases like Cooper have elevated
the judicial supremacy concept to a high water mark.78 Professors Larry
Alexander and Fred Schauer argue that Cooper’s judicial supremacy offers a
crucial component of the American system—settlement of contested
issues.79 In effect, Alexander and Schauer suggest that someone has to be the

70. Bhagwat, supra note 64, at 1099.
71. Campbell Robertson, Roy Moore, Alabama, Chief Justice, Suspended over Gay
Marriage Order, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/01/us/roymoore-alabama-chief-justice.html.
72. Kramer, supra note 57, at 6.
73. Id. at 169.
74. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004).
75. Id. at 252.
76. Id. at 248.
77. Id. at 221.
78. David A. Strauss, Little Rock and the Legacy of Brown, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1065,
1085 (2008), https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles/5885/.
79. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1371–81 (1997); see also Evan Bernick, Cooper v.
Aaron and Judicial Authority: Lessons from Little Rock, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 2, 2015,
11:46 AM, updated Oct. 2, 2016) https://www.huffingtonpost.com/evan-bernick/cooper-v-
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decider regarding how the Constitution is to be applied in any particular
situation and that someone is the judiciary.80 Constitutional interpretations
are continuously made by any number of decision makers, e.g., members of
Congress, the President, the cop on the beat, and the courts at various
levels.81 In the end, however, the buck stops with the Court.82
Professor Josh Blackman has written an innovative article regarding
the development of Cooper that is pending publication in the Georgetown
Law Journal.83 Entitled: The Irrepressible Myths of Cooper v. Aaron, this
work explores the Cooper case with a creative research methodology—a
close study of the written papers of eight of the nine justices who decided
Cooper: Justices Black, Brennan, Burton, Clark, Douglas, Frankfurter,
Harlan, and Chief Justice Warren.84 In particular, the work explores the
concepts of judicial supremacy and universality. Professor Blackman
describes the judicial supremacy concept as the view that whatever the
Supreme Court holds is the supreme law of the land and the universality
concept as the belief that the decisions of the Supreme Court apply broadly,
i.e., to those not parties to the underlying lawsuit.85 Professor Blackman
concludes that judicial supremacy of Supreme Court rulings and their
universal application are, in fact, myths—myths that are not supported by
the Constitution but rather by social norms.86 In the end, however, Professor
Blackman recognizes that not following Supreme Court decisions like
Brown would be irresponsible and that such obedience is “justified by
prudence, the need for stability, and respect for the judiciary.”87
2.

Boundaries: Congress, the Court and “Commandeering”

While the Cooper decision dealt with the boundaries between the Court
and state officials, another aspect of modern American federalism involves
the boundary between actions of the federal government and the states. As
history notes, this boundary has been the subject of debate since the
inception of the Constitution.88 A recent aspect of this debate has been the
aaron-and-judici_b_8233796.html (arguing that the courts serve as a valuable final check on
unconstitutional conduct).
80. See Alexander & Schauer, supra note 79, at 1362.
81. Id. at 1359–60.
82. See generally id. at 1387.
83. Josh Blackman, The Irrepressible Myths of Cooper v. Aaron, 107 GEO. L.J.
(forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3142846).
84. No written records regarding the case were available for the ninth Justice, Justice
Charles Evans Whittaker. See id. at 30.
85. Id. at 16–17.
86. Id. at 53–54.
87. Id. at 54.
88. See generally EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 15, at 193; LEACH, supra note 34.
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question of federal requisitioning of state policies and personnel. A
significant development in this area has been the involvement of the
Supreme Court in setting boundaries between legitimate cooperation
between federal and state actors and the forced cooperation that has become
known as federal commandeering.
What is this thing called “commandeering?” Where did it come from
and what does it have to do with modern American federalism? According
to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, to commandeer means to “take
arbitrary or forcible possession of.”89 The term has as its history the
military taking control of civilian resources.90 With respect to federalism,
commandeering means the requiring by the federal government—
particularly by Congress—of states or state officials to adopt or enforce
federal law or policy.91 More specifically, the term has come to mean
imposing targeted, affirmative, coercive duties on state legislators or
executive officials.92 In response to such action, an anti-commandeering
doctrine has developed.93 This doctrine is largely based on the 10th
Amendment and its reservation of unenumerated powers to the states or the
people.94 The constitutional limit on commandeering was established by the
two remaining Supreme Court cases of our trifecta. These two cases have set
in place a marker for the boundary between federal and states actions. This
anti-commandeering marker prohibits the federal government from forcing
states to do its bidding and has been called a “judicially-created federalism
protection.”95
a.

New York v. United States

Second in the trifecta of modern federalism cases is the 1992 case of
New York v. United States. This case involved the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985.96 This Act was designed to address
the difficult issue of the disposal of radioactive material generated by a
number of sources, e.g., the government, hospitals, research institutions, and
89. Commandeer, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/commandeer (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
90. Id.
91. See generally Bhagwat, supra note 64, at 1098–99.
92. See Mathew D. Adler, State Sovereignty and the Anti-Commandeering Cases, 574
ANNALS 158, 163–64 (2001), https://doi.org/10.1177/000271620157400112.
93. Id. at 163–68; see generally Steven Schwinn, Symposium: It’s Time to Abandon
Anti-Commandeering (But Don’t Count on this Supreme Court to Do it), SCOTUSBLOG
(Aug. 17, 2017, 10:44 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/08/symposium-time-abandonanti-commandeering-dont-count-supreme-court/.
94. Schwinn, supra note 93.
95. Id.
96. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b–2021j (2012).
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various industries.97 Provisions of the Act offered a variety of incentives to
the states, including financial incentives, for appropriate disposal of the
wastes.98 The Act also provided that, should a state not provide for the
disposal of the wastes, the state would “take-title to” and possession of the
wastes.99 And, as a result, these states would be liable for any subsequent
resultant damages from the wastes.100
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote the six-justice majority opinion in
New York that struck down the “take-title” section of the Act.101 While
addressing the modern problem of radioactive wastes, Justice O’Connor
noted that federalism is an old question: “The constitutional question is as
old as the Constitution: It consists of discerning the proper division of
authority between the Federal Government and the States.”102 Continuing
with a quote from Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Association, Inc.,103 Justice O’Connor recognized that in some cases
federalism imposes limits, not on the states, but the federal government: “As
an initial matter, Congress may not simply ‘commandee[r] the legislative
processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a
federal regulatory program.’“104 And declaring that “[s]tates are not mere
political subdivisions of the United States,”105 she found that “whatever the
outer limits of that sovereignty may be, one thing is clear: The Federal
Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal
regulatory program.”106
Justice O’Connor discussed Cooper v. Aaron in her consideration of
commandeering and federalism.107 She specifically addressed the role of the
Court in deciding issues regarding federal power raised by the United
States108 in response to the federal government’s claim based on a number of
cases, including Cooper, that “the Constitution does, in some circumstances,
permit federal directives to state governments.”109 Justice O’Connor
97. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992).
98. Id. at 152–54; see generally Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy:
May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1001, 1009–10 (1995).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (e)(d)(2)(C).
100. Id.
101. New York, 505 U.S. at 188.
102. Id. at 149.
103. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
104. New York, 505 U.S. at 161 (citing Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288, where the Court found
that the Act in question did not impermissibly commandeer the state).
105. Id. at 188.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 178–79.
109. New York, 505 U.S. at 178.
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explained that the federal courts’ power to command state officials to
comply with federal law are not powers shared with Congress.110 Justice
O’Connor concluded:
In sum, the cases relied upon by the United States hold only that
federal law is enforceable in state courts and that federal courts may in
proper circumstances order state officials to comply with federal law,
propositions that by no means imply any authority on the part of Congress to
mandate state regulation.111
b.

Printz v. United States

Third, in the trifecta of modern federalism cases, is the 1997 case of
Printz v. United States. Printz is a case involving the Gun Control Act of
1968.112 The Act prohibits firearms dealers from transferring firearms to a
variety of individuals including convicted felons, unlawful users of
controlled substances, fugitives, individuals judged to be mentally defective
and persons dishonorably discharged from the military.113 A 1993
amendment to the Act, the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady
Act),114 included a provision to establish a national database for instant
background checks regarding firearms sales. An additional provision
required local state law enforcement officers to conduct background checks
until the national database became operational.115 Certain county sheriffs
challenged the constitutionality of the Brady Act’s interim local check
provisions as improper commandeering.116
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the majority opinion in Printz, which
affirmed the New York v. United States prohibition on congressional
attempts to compel state actions and extended that prohibition to
congressional efforts to compel actions of individual state officials.117 In
particular, Justice Scalia emphasized a constitutional commitment to a “dual
sovereignty” view of modern American federalism based on the 10th
Amendment.118 Justice Scalia’s view of federalism envisioned two separate
spheres of authority as essential to the overall constitutional design:

110. Id. at 179.
111. Id.
112. 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq. (1995); see Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 902–04
(1997).
113. Printz, 521 U.S. at 902.
114. Brady Handgun Violence Prevention (Brady Law) Act, Pub. L. 103-159, 107 Stat.
1536 (1993).
115. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (2018).
116. Printz, 521 U.S. at 898.
117. Id. at 935.
118. Id. at 918–919.
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This separation of the two spheres is one of the Constitution’s
structural protections of liberty. “Just as the separation and independence of
the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the
accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of
power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk
of tyranny and abuse from either front.”119
With respect to the judiciary, Justice Scalia drew a distinction between
federal statutes imposing obligations on state courts and those directed to
state executive officials. While the courts, as part of the federal legal system,
can be compelled, Justice Scalia held that state officials are different and
cannot be pressed into federal service.120
c.

Development of anti-commandeering doctrine

Recent cases have continued the New York and Printz view of modern
American federalism. In the 2012 case of National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius,121 the various provisions of the 2010
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act122 were challenged under a
number of grounds. Ultimately, the basic Act was upheld as valid under
Article II Section 8—the Taxing and Spending Clause of the Constitution.123
However, one challenged provision of the Act was declared an
unconstitutional intrusion into state sovereignty and violative of the
principles of federalism.124 This provision stripped all federal Medicaid
funding from states not participating in the Medicaid Expansion aspect of
the Act. 125 The majority opinion of Chief Justice John Roberts regarding the
rejection of the loss of funding provision rested largely on the New YorkPrintz view of federalism. Chief Justice Roberts summarized the limits on
the federal government role in modern American federalism: “the
Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability
to require the States to govern according to Congress’ instructions.”126 And,
while he recognized that “Congress may use its spending power to create
incentives for States to act in accordance with federal policies,”127 Chief
Justice Roberts cautioned: “when ‘pressure turns into compulsion,’ the
119. Id. at 921 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).
120. Id. at 907.
121. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
122. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010), as amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.).
123. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 575.
124. Id. at 577–79.
125. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2018); Id. at 581.
126. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 577.
127. Id.
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legislation runs contrary to our system of federalism.”128 Citing New York,
he reaffirmed that “the Constitution simply does not give Congress the
authority to require the States to regulate.”129
Not surprisingly, this anti-commandeering doctrine has been
questioned. For example, Professor Steven Schwinn argues that this
“doctrine has no basis in the text and structure of the Constitution” and
instead the Supremacy Clause and Oath Clause (Article VI Clause 4) bind
state laws and officials to federal law.130 Additionally, Professor Schwinn
points out that the Constitution itself commandeers the states in various
ways e.g., requiring state legislatures to provide for the election of federal
representatives in Congress (Article I Sections 3 and 4), requiring state
officials to deliver fugitives from justice (Article IV), setting militia
appointment and training to federal standards (Article I Section 8) and
requiring the granting of full faith and credit to the laws of other states
(Article IV).131 Professor Schwinn concludes that history does not support
the anti-commandeering doctrine. More specifically, he cites Hamilton in
Federalist No. 27 and Madison in Federalist No. 44, as evidence of the
framer’s expectancy that state officials would carry out federal laws.132
Similarly, Professor Evan Caminker also claims that the anticommandeering view of proper federal actions is a faulty view of dual
sovereignty because “it relies on an unpersuasive originalist argument
concerning the Framers’ constitutional design.”133 Other scholars view the
anti-commandeering doctrine as without real precedent.134
Despite these objections, the anti-commandeering doctrine is alive and
well. Just this year, the Supreme Court decided another modern federalism
128. Id. at 577–78 (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
129. Id. at 577 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178 (1989)).
130. Schwinn, supra note 93.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Caminker, supra note 98, at 1006.
134. See generally Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz
and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2192 (1998), https://www.jstor.org/stable/1342457
?seq=1 - metadata_info_tab_contents (an examination of the basis for the Printz decision,
reveals only the New York v. United States case as precedent for the anti-commandeering
doctrine); Andrew B. Coan, Commandeering, Coercion, and the Deep Structure of American
Federalism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2015), http://www.bu.edu/bulawreview/files/2015/02
/COAN.pdf (noting that limited caselaw has applied the anti-commandeering doctrine);
Elbert Lin & Thomas M. Johnson Jr., Symposium: High Stakes for Federalism in
Heavyweight Clash over the Anti-Commandeering Doctrine, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 17, 2017,
2:44 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/08/symposium-high-stakes-federalism-heavy
weight-clash-anti-commandeering-doctrine/ (in a discussion prior to the Murphy decision
being handed down observing that the anti-commandeering doctrine will have been applied
only three times in the Supreme Court’s history should it be applied in Murphy—New York,
Printz, and Murphy).
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case involving sports gambling in the states. In the case of Murphy v.
NCAA,135 decided May 14, 2018, the Professional and Amateur Sports
Protection Act,136 which limited state and local sports gambling, was
challenged as violative of the “anti-commandeering” principles of the
Constitution. Justice Samuel Alito wrote the majority opinion that relied on
a dual sovereignty view of federalism under the New York-Printz
rationale:137
The legislative powers granted to Congress are sizable, but they are not
unlimited. The Constitution confers on Congress not plenary legislative
power but only certain enumerated powers. Therefore, all other legislative
power is reserved for the States, as the Tenth Amendment confirms. And
conspicuously absent from the list of powers given to Congress is the power
to issue direct orders to the governments of the States. The
anticommandeering doctrine simply represents the recognition of this limit
on congressional authority.138
Given these recent examples of the continued application of the “anticommandeering” doctrine developed in the second and third trifecta cases,
New York and Printz, the concept seems to have established itself as an
important factor in the boundary determinations between Congress and the
states that is enforced by the courts.
d.

Recent modern federalism applications

The Murphy decision illustrates that debates regarding modern
American federalism are ongoing. Another example of current debates
concerning the continuing federal-state boundary line issue is seen in the
context of federal immigration efforts that are countered by actions of
certain states. Here we see the trifecta at play. In some cases, a state will
want to go beyond federal immigration requirements and take action on its
own. This situation was addressed in Arizona v. United States,139 a Supreme
Court case involving an Arizona state law that purported to give
immigration law enforcement powers to local law enforcement. The case
raised the question of the boundary between the federal and state
governments and who decides.140 The Supreme Court ruled several sections
of the state law involved federal matters and were therefore preempted from
Arizona’s authority.141 As a result, the Supreme Court limited Arizona from
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
28 U.S.C. § 3701 et. seq. (1992).
See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1467.
Id. at 1476.
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 388 (2012).
Id. at 399–400.
Id. at 410.
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taking certain actions in the immigration field.142 This illustrates a flipped
version of Cooper, which demanded the taking of actions by Arkansas
officials regarding desegregation.
On the other hand, a commandeering situation has arisen when states
do not want to assist in the enforcement of federal immigration laws.
Several state and local governments have declared themselves as
“sanctuaries” from the federal government’s immigration law enforcement
activities.143 This sanctuary status can take a variety of forms. Generally, the
sanctuary means that the local governments will not cooperate or assist with
federal actions—especially immigration enforcement.144 The movement
stems from the 1980s when a number of groups, religious groups in
particular, opposed federal asylum policy regarding Central American
refugees.145 Recently, President Trump issued an Executive Order that
purported to withhold federal funds from localities that refused to support
the Administration’s immigration enforcement actions.146 Not unexpectedly,
this federalism issue has been taken to the courts. For example, in the case
of City of Chicago v. Sessions, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit ruled that the Administration’s effort to force assistance
through the funding process goes beyond what the applicable statutes allow:
“The Attorney General, in this case, used the sword of federal funding to
conscript state and local authorities to aid in federal civil immigration
enforcement” and characterized the approach as a “usurpation of
power.”147After a number of federal courts issued injunctions blocking the
withholding of funds and the upholding of the injunctions at the federal
appellate level, the Trump Administration has asked the Supreme Court to
rule on the injunctions.148 The situation pends.

142. Id. at 416.
143. See generally Tal Kopan, What are Sanctuary Cities, and Can They be Defunded?,
CNN (Mar. 26, 2018, 3:30 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/25/politics/sanctuary-citiesexplained/index.html.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017). For a discussion of this
action by the President and its relation to the commandeering question, see Ilya Somin, Why
Trump’s Executive Order on Sanctuary Cities is Unconstitutional, WASH. POST (Jan. 26,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/01/26/constitutional-problems-with-trumps-executive-order-on-sanctuarycities/?utm_term=.6a1f6980b718.
147. City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d. 272, 277 (7th Cir. 2018).
148. Ariane de Vogue, Trump Admin Asks Supreme Court to Lift Ban on Sanctuary City
Policy, CNN (June 18, 2018 10:37 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/18/politics/sanctuarycities-supreme-court/index.html.
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III. CONCLUSION
This discussion of the trifecta of modern American federalism cases
has involved two important principles of the American system of
government—separation of powers and federalism.149 Cooper’s
pronouncements regarding judicial supremacy, in particular, have had a
direct impact on these concepts. As noted previously,150 the claim that the
Court’s interpretations of the Constitution are merely interpretations of
constitutional law and not the Constitution has been debated. The reality is
that the Court’s interpretations bring about a settlement of the constitutional
questions that come before it. The Court’s interpretations may be
challenged, but they are usually followed. In that respect, Supreme Court
decisions are enforced through general acceptance. It is true that, over time,
the Court’s decisions may be modified or overturned or even subject to
Article V amendment. As a result, the law is dynamic. This dynamism is
part of the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. There have always been
changes in the boundaries between the states and the federal governments.
We see this in the different eras of dual and cooperative federalism.151
Nonetheless, the Court’s interpretations are followed by the states—
perhaps grudgingly as seen in Cooper. And, as set out in New York and
Printz, this also applies to the other branches of the federal government—
perhaps grudgingly as well. Cooper’s principles regarding judicial
supremacy apply to both the federal and the state governments in cases
involving the boundaries between the two.
The debate over modern American federalism, while in some ways a
moving target, is bounded by our trifecta of modern American federalism
cases: Cooper, New York, and Printz. As the first-place finisher in the
trifecta, Cooper stands for the proposition that the Supreme Court is the
“decider” in cases involving the principles of federal-state boundaries. In
particular, Cooper deals with state actions in modern American federalism.
And, with respect to federal actions regarding states in modern American
federalism, the second and third place finishers of the trifecta, New York and
Printz—address limits as well—applicable to actions of the federal
government. Who decides is the key question in the debates over modern
American federalism. The answer is found in a trifecta of cases, which
begins with Cooper v. Aaron.
Recently, the University of South Alabama hosted Professor Michael
Gerhardt of the University of North Carolina School of Law as part of the
149. See supra Part II.B.
150. See supra Part II.C.1.a.
151. See supra Part II.B. Our trifecta is a part of this dynamism. Cooper was decided
during the era of the Post-New Deal Court’s Cooperative Federalism while New York and
Printz were decided during the era of the Rehnquist Court’s Mild Dual Federalism.
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2018 Constitution Day program. After discussing several of the docketed
cases for the Supreme Court’s upcoming 2018-2019 term, Professor
Gerhardt, who has served as Special Counsel to the Senate Judiciary
Committee regarding several Supreme Courts Justice nominations, offered
commentary on the Supreme Court and the direction of the law. In his
remarks, he emphasized that, in his view, the Court’s future work would
largely be in the areas of statutory interpretation and questions of
federalism.152 Professor Gerhardt is likely to be right and, as a result, Cooper
is especially timely, even after sixty years.

152. Michael Gerhardt, Remarks at the Constitution Day Presentation of the University of
South Alabama, Mobile, Alabama (Sept. 17, 2018) (heard by the author, who was in
attendance).

